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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX
THE "GOING PUBLIC THROUGH THE BACK DOOR"
PHENOMENON - AN ASSESSMENT
By RONALD M. SHAPIRO* and LAURENCE M. KATZ**
Substantial stockholders in privately held corporations must fre-
quently weigh the advantages and disadvantages, either real or sup-
posed, of "going public." They seek the glamour and financial gain of
being significant stockholders in, or management of, a company whose
securities appear in the "pink sheets" and are publicly traded. At the
same time, they are somewhat dismayed when they explore the three tra-
ditional requirements which generally must be met in order to go public.
First, an underwriter must be found who is willing to distribute
the stock publicly through that underwriter's market-making channels.'
Even if such a contact is made and intentions to underwrite are ex-
pressed, uncertainty may persist as to whether, in fact, the investment
banker will ultimately underwrite a public offering of the stock. Gener-
ally, underwriters do not legally bind themselves to undertake a financ-
ing until immediately preceding the commencement of an offering.
Furthermore, even if the underwriting is obtainable, the cost may
involve not only the traditional underwriting "spread," but also dis-
tribution to the underwriter of "cheap stock" or signficant amounts of
"warrants and options."2
Secondly, securities attorneys and independent accountants must
be retained to "clean up" the corporation for a public offering and
to prepare the necessary filings, perhaps along with underwriters'
attorneys, for registration with the Securities and Exchange Corn-
mission.' This step not only may involve incurring sizable fees, but
also opens the management of the private corporation to a searching
* Associate, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland;
Lecturer, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1964, Haverford College;
LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; LL.B.,
1963, University of Maryland.
1. It is possible "to go public" without engaging the services of an underwriter;
a private company may make a non-underwritten direct offer of its stock through
some kind of public offering process, be it on a limited basis via a Regulation A
exemption filing or a full-blown registration. Nevertheless, there are dangers in-
herent in attempting to go public iii this non-underwritten manner which include
improper market coverage for the securities offered and a lTck of back-up financing
support for the company.
See G. ROBINSON, GOING PUBLIC §§ 1-47 (1961), for a. rudimentary dis-
cussion of the preliminary considerations and practical mechanics of underwriting
pursuant to going public.
2. It should be emphasized that the security brokerage profession as a whole
displays the utmost integrity in its work. Nevertheless, the private company seeking
public status is often confronted with no buyers in the legitimate securities investment
banking market place. Hence it is forced to make contact with underwriters whose
methods of underwriting and demands on their clients are somewhat questionable.
3. It is possible that the existing corporate counsel has securities experience
and therefore the services of outside securities specialists will not have to be retained.
It should, however, be pointed out that the expense of legal services in connection
with a registration statement and subsequent public offering runs into more hours
and higher expense than traditional corporate legal work.
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liability investigation by the attorneys which may prove offensive to
its closed corporation sensibilities.
Thirdly, the private about-to-be public corporation must undergo
the time-consuming SEC registration process required by the Securities
Act of 1933' (the Act). Such a process may currently take more than
three months and often tries the patience of the public-looking private
management which has never been faced with the rigors of SEC regu-
lation and desires to get into the market as quickly as possible.5
Confronted with such a maze of uncertainty, potential costs, legal
probity, and delay, private corporate management may seek to attain
public status through a back door which ostensibly need not be opened
by the keys of underwriters, legal and financial securities specialists, and
SEC registration. More accessible, and perhaps more familiar, keys
may provide an easier route to the goal of being public. The coopera-
tion or control of an available and quiescent public corporate shell or
of a public operating company, combined with any one of several
familiar corporate techniques such as mergers and spin-offs may be
the only keys necessary to enter the public securities market. Although
those using these techniques will probably not be raising funds for the
corporation, they seem to believe that, at a lesser cost and with less
difficulty, they have made financing on a private or public basis more
readily accessible in the future and have enhanced the value and the
marketability of their own stock.
Despite the apparent simplicity and appeal of these methods of
entry to public status, it must be asked whether that entrance opens
onto a rocky road involving serious legal and practical problems. Will
the corporation that has gone public in this manner find that its tech-
nique has led it into the dangerous realm of possible securities act
violations? Furthermore, will the corporation have lost something by
not taking the traditional route to public status, assuming it was, on
some basis, intrinsically worthy of achieving such status; or in other
words, has it gone public merely for going public's sake? This article
will discuss the answers to these questions and will analyze the legal
and practical implications of certain devices employed by private cor-
porate management to enter the public company realm by other than
traditional means.
I. BASIC DEVIcES FOR "GOING PUBLIC" WITHOUT
SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION
Three typical transactions include the basic elements of the vary-
ing techniques being used to bring corporations public without either
Securities Act registration or underwriter involvement.
Example A. Sale of Shares to Public Corporation and Public
Corporation Distribution Thereof to Its Shareholders. Pri-Corp is
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1965).
5. There is a possibility, under current SEC practice, that a registration state-
ment filed with the SEC will receive so-called "expedited treatment" and that the
registration process as a result thereof can be as brief as twenty-five days. Such
expeditious handling of registration statements received from corporations about to
go public for the first time, however, is highly improbable.
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a privately held and somewhat successful company. It has been profit-
able for its few owners. During its operating history, it has had no
need to disclose and has not in fact released general and financial
information concerning its operations. Pub-Corp is a publicly held
operating company and its stock is actively traded over the counter.
Pri-Corp arranges a transaction in which Pub-Corp will transfer
some nominal asset' to Pri-Corp in exchange for a non-control per-
centage of Pri-Corp shares. Pub-Corp then issues most of the Pri-
Corp stock it has acquired to Pub-Corp shareholders as a dividend,
so that a portion of Pri-Corp stock is now in the hands of the numerous
Pub-Corp shareholders. Subsequent sales by those shareholders will
then create a public market in Pri-Corp securities.
Example B. Mass Produced Spin-Offs. Pub-Corp is a publicly
held corporation which was organized for uranium exploration in the
early 1960's during the uranium boom, and which became inactive
shortly thereafter for lack of uranium finding success. The outstand-
ing stock of Pub-Corp was traded over the counter for several years
and is in the hands of thousands of shareholders. Its trading activity
has been quiescent for some time. A group of promoters has taken
control of Pub-Corp and offers the opportunity to go public to all
private corporations willing to give to Pub-Corp stockholders a por-
tion of their stock. Stock of Pri-Corp is transferred to this inactive
Pub-Corp, as in Example A, and part of these shares are transferred
as a dividend or spun off to Pub-Corp shareholders. In other words,
Example B is the same as Example A except that the Pub-Corp is not
an operating company. As will be discussed later, this difference be-
tween the two examples may make some difference in the legality of
non-registration. After the spin-off to Pub-Corp shareholders, Pri-
Corp now has a percentage of its stock in the hands of thousands of
public shareholders and has "gone public."
7
Example C. Merger or Other Combination with a Shell Sub-
sidiary of the Public Company. Pub-Corp, an operating public com-
pany, spins off the stock of its subsidiary, Sub-Pub-Corp, as a dividend
to its shareholders. Sub-Pub-Corp has been a "shell" with little or no
assets. Pri-Corp arranges a transaction through which Pri-Corp is
merged into Sub-Pub-Corp with former Pri-Corp management acquir-
ing control of the new Sub-Pub-Corp organization. Pri-Corp man-
agement has thus transferred the assets of Pri-Corp into the public
shell in exchange for the controlling interest in that shell. In effect,
Pri-Corp, now existing within the shell of Sub-Pub-Corp, has numer-
ous shareholders who may trade the formerly private stock of the
company in the over-the-counter market.8
6. State corporate statutes generally require some consideration for such trans-
fers. See note 9 infra.
7. Mass-produced spin-offs have also been called "popcorn spin-offs" because the
stock of the private corporation is exploded out to the shareholders of the public cor-
poration in much the same way that the vendor's popcorn kernels explode from
dormancy in the bottom of a cooker into the hands of the buying public.
8. The appellations Pri-Corp, Pub-Corp and Sub-Pub-Corp will be continued
throughout the text without footnote treatment. Likewise, future references to
Examples A, B and C are to those hypna 1-'al situations just outlined.
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Although numerous variations on the techniques in the above
examples may be used to achieve public status, these examples appear
to be the basic forms of transactions which have been used to avoid
both Securities Act registration and underwriter participation. In addi-
tion they raise all of the basic securities law problems which would
confront anyone attempting to go public through the back door.9
II. THE REGISTRATION PROBLEMS OF THE PRIVATE
SALE/SPIN-OFF TECHNIQUE
The registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 are
designed to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of informa-
tion in the interstate distribution of securities where the securities are
publicly offered for sale by an issuing company or by a person in
control of such company. Disclosure is sought by requiring the issuer
of such securities to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
a registration statement, including a prospectus, containing relevant
financial and other information about the company's business and
management and about the offering. The core provision of the Act
is Section 510 which, among other things, prohibits any sale of a
security in interstate commerce unless a registration statement is in
effect. While Section 5 is absolute on its face, it is modified by Sec-
tions 311 and 412 of the Act which exempt certain securities and certain
transactions from the registration requirements.
Traditionally, the framers of transactions such as those described
in Examples A and B (private sale/spin-off methods), rather than
comply with the registration and prospectus requirements, have sought
refuge from full disclosure behind one of these exemptions. It is
obvious, however, upon execution of either of these non-registration
techniques, that Pri-Corp's securities will have been placed in the hands
of the public without the disclosure of adequate information about
Pri-Corp. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in a recent
release,1 3 has questioned whether such private sale/spin-off devices
should be exempt from registration. The Commission noted that
9. As a fourth possibility, Pri-Corp may transfer its assets for a controlling
interest in Pub-Corp stock. While such a technique may not present the problems
discussed in part III infra, it would be subject to the anti-fraud implications of
part IV infra.
Suggestions have been made that a private company might go public (for the
sake of going public) by merely mailing a portion of its stock to all of the residents
of the town of Haverford, Pennsylvania. Such a mailing device, clearly involving
no sale of securities, certainly would achieve the goal of placing stock in public hands
without the securities problems discussed herein. See parts II and III infra. This
transaction, however, raises serious problems from the standpoint of state corporate
law because of the general statutory requirements that issuance by a corporation of
its stock must be for consideration. E.g., DXL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 152, 153 (1953) ;
MD. ANN. CODS art. 23, § 20(c) (1966). Of course, once consideration, even if
nominal, enters the picture, so does a sale, and the Securities Act registration pro-
visions become operative.
Other than in the context of this footnote, state corporate law problems have
not been discussed in this article.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
11. Id. § 77(c).
12. Id. § 77(d).
13. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969).
1969]
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"[d]evices of this kind, contravene the purpose, as well as the specific
provisions, of the Act which, in the words of the statutory preamble,
are 'to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails and to
prevent frauds in the sale thereof.' ""i In the view of the Commission,
the circumstances of a spin-off by Pub-Corp followed by active trading
in Pri-Corp's stock, all in the absence of information about Pri-Corp,
create a potential for fraud and deceit.' 5
Despite the jaundiced view of Example A and B type transac-
tions expressed by the Commission in the release, those continuing to
use these techniques persist in their view that registration is not re-
quired. Their claim to legality rests on the assertion that the private
sale/spin-off fits within the mold of two separate transactions, neither
of which is subject to registration. The first transaction is the sale
by Pri-Corp (the issuer) of its securities to Pub-Corp. This sale, it
is contended, is exempt under Section 4(2) of the Act as a non-public,
private offering.' The second transaction is the distribution by
Pub-Corp of the issuer's securities as a dividend to the Pub-Corp
stockholders. Here it is claimed that the registration requirements
of the Act do not apply since no "sale" has taken place to make the
requirements operative.' 7
The private offering exemption of Section 4(2), the basis for
seeking to exempt the sale of Pri-Corp's stock to Pub-Corp, appears
on its face to be deceptively simple; the gloss, however, is substan-
tial. This provision exempting transactions by an issuer which do not
involve any public offering was included in the Act on the theory that
the Act's registration and prospectus protections are unnecessary where
securities are offered to sophisticated investors; rather they are only
required where offerings thereof are made to members of the general
public.'" To qualify for the Section 4(2) exemption securities must
"come to rest" in the hands of qualified offerees."9 The initial offering
must be private. Furthermore, if the securities are taken by a person
who has purchased with a view to or in connection with a distribu-
tion of any security, that person will be deemed a statutory under-
writer and the entire offering will lose its exempt status.2" Thus, if
the initial offerees in an ostensibly private offering re-offer their
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (2) (1964). This section exempts from registration all
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (3) (1964), gives the statutory definition of sale.
18. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Glo. WASH.
L. REv. 29, 37 (1959).
The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group
of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal
government. That bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it was, could hardly
equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was their own money
that they were spending.
19. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
20. At the outset it should be understood that if securities are first offered and
sold to qualified offerees and at a somewhat later date additional securities are offered
to non-qualified offerees, then the entire series of transactions may be "integrated"
into one public "issue" and the exemption lost. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552
(Nov. 6, 1962).
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securities to the public they may be deemed "underwriters" and the
issuer's initial offering will be viewed as a public offering. This rule
is sometimes stated as a requirement that the initial offerees take
from the issuer with "investment intent."
The search for a usable standard to determine who is a proper
offeree under Section 4(2) has been difficult. The legislative history
of the exemption adds little to the meaning of "private offering." 2'
The void was initially filled by a 1935 General Counsel's opinion
issued in a Commission release." The release noted that opinions
had been expressed by the General Counsel's office that an offering
"to an insubstantial number of persons is a transaction by the issuer
not involving any public offering" and that "under ordinary circum-
stances an offering to not more than approximately twenty-five per-
sons is not an offering to a substantial number . ,,2" The release
cautioned, however, that qualifications for the exemption could not be
determined exclusively by the number of offerees and that to qualify
it was necessary to examine all of the "surrounding circumstances."
Among the circumstances to be examined were (1) the number of
offerees and their relationship to each other and to the issuers, (2)
the number of units offered, (3) the size of the offering, and (4) the
manner of the offering.
Despite the broad scope of the surrounding circumstances con-
cept, the number of offerees and their relationship to the issuer pre-
dominated as the crucial private offering criteria. 24 Moreover, it was
generally accepted as a rule of thumb that an offering to twenty-five
or less was exempt. 5 It may be, however, that under some circum-
stances even a sole offeree may not be a qualified offeree. Thus,
consideration of the cases which have applied principles other than
numbers is important.
In SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,26 Sunbeam contracted to
purchase the assets of a second corporation. Pending approval of
the agreement by the two companies' shareholders, Sunbeam offered
securities to 530 individuals, all of whom were stockholders of either
Sunbeam or the second corporation or both. The district court held
21. The reference in the House Report to the exemption as permitting "an issuer
to make a specific or isolated sale of its securities to a particular person" has been
considered too restrictive to act as a guide to corporate counsel and their clients.
Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rzv. 1043, 1046 (1964). See also 1 L. Loss, SZCURITIS REGuLATION 653 (2d ed. 1961).
22. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
23. Id.
24. Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39
N.Y.U.L. Riv. 1043, 1047 (1964).
25. Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act -
A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503, 515 (1966);
Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 MINN.
L. RZv. 25, 33 (1957). See E. THOMAs, FzDgRAL SCURrrITSs AcT HANDBOOK 30
(3d ed. 1969), where a warning is given to those practitioners who continue to use
this number as a guide, cautioning that "it is unsafe to rely exclusively on numbers,"
since as the numbers increase the risk of relying upon the exemption increases.
In SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), citing, SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), it was determined that the number of offerees
is not conclusive, but "is relevant only to the question whether they have the requisite
association with and knowledge of the issuer which make the exemption available."
26. 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
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that the offering was not public. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals accepted the SEC's position that " '[s]uch an offering,
though not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is none the
less "public" in character, for the means used to select the particular
individuals to whom the offering is to be made bear no sensible relation
to the purposes for which the selection is made.' "217 Although what
would be a sensible relation was not made clear, it is apparent that the
exemption would not be available where a limited class of offerees was
selected merely as a scheme for circumventing the Act.
This "sensible relations" standard was effective insofar as it recog-
nized the danger of establishing artificial classifications merely to avoid
the registration requirements of the Act. But the test has been difficult
to apply because "at times there might appear to be a sensible relation
between the class selected and the purpose of the selection, [and yet]
the transaction might not deserve exemption as a private offering."2
An illustration of the deficiencies of the "sensible relations" test
as a sole guide is found in the landmark SEC action against Ralston
Purina Company.2 9 Ralston Purina had a history of encouraging
stock ownership by its employees. In 1951, the company, claiming
the private offering exemption, offered to sell securities without regis-
tration to about 500 "key" employees. All parties agreed that an
offering to all 7000 employees would have required registration. 0
The company's definition of "key employee" was as follows:
A key employee of course can be an officer or a department head
or an assistant to a department head but is not confined to an
organization chart. It would include an individual who is eligible
for promotion, an individual who especially influences others or
who advises others, a person whom the employees look to in
some special way, an individual, of course, who carries some
special responsibility, who is sympathetic to management and who
is ambitious and who the management feels is likely to be pro-
moted to a greater responsibility."
27. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
28. Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1043, 1049 (1964).
29. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), rev'g 200 F.2d 85 (8th
Cir.), 102 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
30. 346 U.S. at 122.
31. 200 F.2d at 87. The company's reasons for not wanting to register the yearly
offering to these employees are understandable. A vice-president and director testified:
The reasons are very definite. Personally, I have been through a registrationjust once, and when we started to register our preferred stock, we started in
January. It took until May 15th before we could get the schedules. It cost us
tens of thousands of dollars. Now, when you are putting out an issue, or when
you are selling to a group, to a small intimate group, if the sale is between three
or four or ten thousand shares and you have to spend for a hundred special
accountants' fees, lawyers' fees, printing expenses, travel expenses, clerical ex-
penses - there is a host of expenses in connection with the registration which
makes it entirely unwarranted to spend that much money to accommodate key
employees. The big factor is a very important factor. We come to the end of
the year; we cannot wait 32 months to know what we are going to do; we have
to deal with our employees, pay our bonuses, and make our deals then. If we
have to wait for 3y 2 months, or if we have to wait for 2y2 months, which probably
would be a pretty fair length of time, and then pay financial extras, legal people,
accounting people, printing, long distance telephone and telephone calls, clerical
326 [VOL. XXIX
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Based in part on the company's concept of "key employee," the dis-
trict court concluded that the offering was not public . 2 Relying on
Sunbeam, it found that "[t]he sole purpose of the 'selection' is to keep
part stock ownership of the business within the operating personnel
of the business and to spread ownership throughout all departments
and activities of the business" and held that "[tihe purpose of the
selection bears a 'sensible relation' to the class chosen. '33 The court
of appeals affirmed, viewing the transaction as "intra-organizational
offerings of stock by the Company, unaccompanied by any solicitation,
which have resulted in a limited distribution of stock, for investment
purposes, to a select group of employees considered by the manage-
ment to be worthy of retention and probable future promotion." 4
The Supreme Court rejected this application of the sensible rela-
tions test and found the exemption to be unavailable. It concluded
that "[t]he focus of the inquiry should be on the need of the offerees
for the protections afforded by the registration. '35  In order for the
offering to qualify for the exemption, the offerees must be "able to
fend for themselves. '3'  As an example of a group fulfilling such quali-
fications, the Court referred to "executive personnel who because of
their position have access to the same kind of information that the
Act would make available in the form of a registration statement."3
So, in addition to having a degree of sophistication, it is critical that
the offeree have access to relevant information about the company."'
It is not sufficient that an unsophisticated offeree acknowledge that
such information has been made available to him. 9 Furthermore, the
issuer may not avoid otherwise required registration by obtaining a
potential purchaser's waiver of the Act's requirement.4
With this background it might reasonably be asked whether
Pub-Corp fits the legal mold of a qualified offeree in the private
sale/spin-off transaction between it and Pri-Corp. An affirmative
response to this question is doubtful in the case of Example B, where
Pub-Corp is a mere defunct shell. Such an empty state of corporate
existence may bespeak a general lack of sound business judgment and
expenses, travel, and pile all that expense on the sale of a few shares of stock to
an intimate group, we feel that that is entirely unwarranted, and it is a matter
of economy on our part....
Id. at 88-89.
32. 102 F. Supp. at 970.
33. Id. at 968-69.
34. 200 F.2d at 93.
35. 346 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added). In keeping with the broadly remedial
purposes of federal securities legislation, the burden of proving that the initial offerees
were all part of a "private" group was placed on the issuer claiming the exemption.
Id. at 126. See also Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959). While
the statute contains no numerical limit, the Supreme Court in Ralston indicated that
the SEC could establish a numerical test in deciding when to investigate. 346 U.S.
at 125. The significance of the numbers will vary depending on the nature of the
offeree group. See note 25 supra.
36. 346 U.S. at 125.
37. Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
38. See also In re Gilligan, Will & Co., 38 S.E.C. 388, 393 (1958), aff'd, 267
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
39. United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481, 489 (D. Md.
1965), aff'd, 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
40. 376 F.2d at 679; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
19691
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financial acumen - qualities requisite for sophisticated investment
decisions. Even where Pub-Corp, as in Example A, is an operating
company, there is no assurance that it has ready access to general
and financial information relating to the issuer, Pri-Corp. Pri-Corp
presumably has never compiled the type of information about itself
and perhaps has never even obtained the certified financial statements
usually deemed necessary for informed investment judgments. More-
over, by the very nature of the nominal consideration involved and
the spin-off orientation of the transaction, Pub-Corp has no particular
incentive to use either its sophistication, if any, its relationship to the
issuer, if any, or its access to relevant information, if any. Hence it
is highly questionable whether the Pri-Corp/Pub-Corp "private" sale
transaction adequately demonstrates the characteristics of a valid
private offering exempt transaction. 1
Even if Pub-Corp were a sophisticated and fully informed pur-
chaser of Pri-Corp shares, the sale of such shares, in Examples A
and B, to Pub-Corp may not be exempt under Section 4(2) because
of the lack of investment intent.
The purpose of the exemption of non-public offerings would
appear to have been to make registration unnecessary in these
relatively few cases where an issuer desires to consummate a
transaction or a few transactions and where the transaction or
transactions are of such a nature that the securities in question
are not likely to come into the hands of the general public.42
Thus the SEC and the case law have added the requirement that the
offeree must not take "with a view to public distribution." The very
purpose of transactions like those of Examples A and B is to place
Pri-Corp securities in the hands of the general public. The results
of such an intention contravene the policy underlying the private
offering exemption.
In summary, it is crucial to a successful claim to Section 4(2)
exemption status not only that an offering initially be made to qualified
offerees, but also that the shares so offered not pass to persons in-
tending to make a distribution thereof. If a purchaser takes the
securities with a view to "distribution," he will be deemed an under-
writer within Section 2(11) of the Act, and the issuer will have
violated Section 5 of the Act. Moreover, such a statutory underwriter
may not distribute securities unless he does so pursuant to an effective
registration statement.4 3  If he does distribute publicly without regis-
41. The Supreme Court in Ralston rejected the lower courts' use of the sensible
purposes test and held that even if that test were satisfied the private offering
exemption was still unavailable in that case because all of the offerees did not have
the ability to fend for themselves. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
While compliance with the sensible relations test may no longer be sufficient to satisfy
the private offering exemption, failure to satisfy even that test will certainly bar access
to the private offering exemption.
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
43. Section 4(1) does not exempt underwriters from the registration require-
ments of Section 5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(d) (1), (e) (1964). This does not mean, however,
that purchasers in private transactions may never resell. If their subsequent sales are
consistent with an original taking for investment, as opposed to taking with a view
[VOL. XXIX
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tration, then the issuer as well may suffer liability, regardless of its
lack of knowledge that its purchaser would be a statutory underwriter
by virtue of his (the purchaser's) planned distribution . 4  Thus, if such
purchaser is deemed a statutory underwriter, the private offering
exemption will be lost.
It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether Pub-Corp takes
"with a view to distribution": that is, whether its dividend of Pri-Corp
shares is a "distribution." While Section 2 (11) does not define "distri-
bution," this term has been considered to be "essentially synonomous
with public offering." 5 A review of the cases and Commission releases
reveals that the existence of a sale to the public has played a key role
in the determination of whether a distribution which obviates the
Section 4(2) exemption has occurred.
It is clear in the private sale/spin-off transactions of Examples A
and B that Pub-Corp is purchasing from Pri-Corp at least some shares
without an intent to hold them for investment. As to these shares
it intends to, and ultimately does, transfer them to its shareholders.
If this transfer to Pub-Corp shareholders involves a sale, then the
initial sale by Pri-Corp to Pub-Corp cannot be an exempt private
offering; it is but a step in a "public offering" and violates the regis-
tration requirements of the Act. The transfer as framed by the examples
and as often cast in practice, however, takes the form of a dividend of
corporate portfolio securities. It is argued that the dividend transfer is
neither a "public offering" nor a sale and hence not a "distribution."
The ordinary stock dividend does not constitute a "sale" because
it is not a disposition for "value."46 And in isolation the distribution
of portfolio securities, whether as dividends or in liquidation, is not
subject to registration because of this no sale characterization. 7 But
should this rationale apply where the portfolio dividend is only a last
step in a transaction designed to achieve private offering exemption?
to distribution, such purchasers are not underwriters and the issuer is only involved
in a private transaction with the original purchasers. And a "change of circumstances"
requiring resale is not deemed inconsistent with the original investment intent. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) ; Flanagin, The Federal Securities
Act and the Locked-in Stockholder, 63 MICH. L. Rtv. 1139, 1153-54 (1965).
44. See In re Skiatron Electronics & Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236, 245 (1960);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957) (Crowell-Collier Publish-
ing Co.).
45. See I L. Loss, SECURIrES REGULATION 551 & n.307 (2d ed. 1961) ; SEC, A
REAPPRAISAL Or FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs
161-62 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
46. I L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 517-18 (2d ed. 1961); Bromberg,
Corporate Liquidation and Securities Law - Problems in the Distribution of Port-
folio Securities, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961).
In SEC Securities Act Release No. 929 (July 29, 1936), the General Counsel
indicated that no "sale" took place (1) when a stock dividend is declared by itself
(no cash involved) and (2) when stock or cash are offered in the alternative and
the taking of either waives the right to the other. The contrary result was indicated
when the corporation allows stockholders an option to forego a declared cash dividend
in favor of a dividend of securities. In that situation the waiver or surrender of the
claim to cash constitutes "value" and a "sale" is involved.
47. Cf. Investment Company Act Rule 17a-5 which excludes an investment
company's pro rata distribution in cash or kind from the terms "purchase" and "sale"
as used in Section 17(a) of that Act if no stockholder is given an election as to a
specific portfolio security he receives. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-5 (1969).
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No case or release has expressly stated that a sale following the
initial "private" sale is essential to finding a distribution. There is
authority that the private offering exemption will be denied because
of subsequent distribution even though one of the usual elements of
sale by the issuer to a statutory underwriter, followed by sales by
such underwriter to the public, is missing. A situation in which this
result has been urged involves a controlling shareholder who, as a
''control person," is deemed to be an issuer under the Act and thus
subject to the registration and private offering exemption rules in the
distribution of his stock.4" One authority has taken the position that
when a control person donates stock to a charitable institution, the
donee may not freely resell the stock publicly without being deemed an
underwriter as one "selling for an issuer."49 The control person, there-
fore, will have violated the registration requirements of the Act even
though he made no sale, and the donee will be an underwriter even
though it did not purchase.5" The result may be the same in the situa-
tion of a daughter of the control person who, in order to diversify her
portfolio, sells a substantial block of securities she has received from her
father as a wedding gift. While the donor receives no tax advantage
from the daughter's sale, "the family relationship makes it easier to say
that the daughter is an 'underwriter' in the sense that she is 'selling for'
her father. ' '5 1 In both of these examples, the control person's transfer
may violate the registration requirements even though he receives no
value himself, at least where his donee had no original investment intent.
It is also clear that one may be an underwriter even though he
receives no value. The language of Section 2(11) contemplates this,
for it defines underwriter as "any person who . . . offers or sells for
an issuer. . . ." The classic example is found in SEC v. Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association.5 2 There, Consolidated formed
a committee to solicit the purchase of bonds issued by the Republic
of China. Its selling activities were limited to the Chinese communi-
ties in the New York area. It had no contract with the Chinese
government and was not compensated for its efforts. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it was an under-
writer within the statutory definition of Section 2(11)."
Thus it seems that the private offering exemption may be denied
even though (1) the issuer does not receive value or (2) the under-
48. A control person is one who possesses, directly or indirectly, "the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (f) (1969). See Sommer, Who's "In-Control"? - S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559
(1966), for an excellent discussion of this concept.
49. Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance to CCH, Aug. 8,
1962, 1 CCH Fzi. Szc. L. RzP. 1551.60 (1967). This is so where the gift is made
"under circumstances in which a redistribution to the public by the donee may rea-
sonably be anticipated." Id.
50. In connection with gifts by control persons, many lawyers require that the
donee take only for investment. IV L. Loss, SXCURITIS RGULATION 2647 (Supp.
1969). This, however, diminishes the tax value of the gift in the eyes of the donor.
S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 32-33
(C. Israels ed. 1962).
51. IV L. Loss, SEcuPITMs RXOULATION 2577 (Supp. 1969).
52. 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
53. Id. at 740.
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writer does not receive value. But in each of the situations just dis-
cussed the public buyers from either the issuer or the underwriter paid
value to one or the other. The proponents of the private sale/spin-off
technique would argue that this difference is crucial on the ground
that the draftsmen of the Act limited the requirement of registration
in Section 5 to a public sale and only intended to protect persons
who gave value for shares in an initial public offering. Even on this
limited interpretation, value may be present. It may be that the
requisite value passes in the subsequent sales by the dividend dis-
tributee of Pub-Corp to other members of the public. 4 This value
theory might require a finding that the distributees themselves were
underwriters. Although the history of the Act and the manner of
Commission enforcement demonstrate a disinclination to label average
shareholders as statutory underwriters, "average shareholders" who
receive gifts of small amounts of stock, either by way of dividends
from a dormant corporation or otherwise, could readily be deemed to
be participating in a distribution for an issuer within the language of
Section 2(11 ) when they accept the gifts with intention to resell. 55
Although the argument that value must pass from the public may
seem at first to fit within the statutory scheme, it is submitted that if the
term "distribution" as used in Section 2(11) and read into Section 4
requires a sale, then the finding that a Pub-Corp dividend of Pri-Corp's
shares is a sale can be based either on value moving from the Pub-Corp
shareholders or on value moving from any source to Pri-Corp.
It has been considered theoretically possible to label the dividend-
distributing Pub-Corp an "underwriter" by finding that the requisite
value for the dividend transfer has passed to the issuer in the form
of the consideration for the original sale.56 A better value argument
based on the real substance of the transaction is that the issuer, Pri-
Corp, receives value in the form of benefit from the public holding
of the stock. Thus, close to the facts in SEC v. Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association,57 Pub-Corp is arranging transfer of Pri-Corp's
shares to the public, with the benefit or value accruing to Pri-Corp.
Even if these value-passing contentions are inconclusive, it might
also be argued that a complete absence of value in a Pri-Corp/Pub-Corp
transaction will not prevent finding Pub-Corp to be an underwriter
54. 12 BNA Sc. Rg. & L. lU. B-3 (Aug. 20, 1969).
55. Generally, the Commission "has refused to apply the 'underwriter' definition
to small purchasers, apparently on the theory that resale of the few shares purchased
could not possibly be considered a 'distribution' of - as opposed to a mere trading in -
securities." Note, Regulation of Nonissuer Transactions under Federal and State
Securities Registration Laws, 78 HARV. L. Rzv. 1635, 1638 (1965).
[D]espite statements that ". . . the ordinary investor who buys directly from
the affiliate is not an 'underwriter' even if he takes for resale," it is suggested
that it would be dangerous to rely upon such language if the controlling person
were disposing of securities aggregating a substantial amount in a group or series
of transactions which might be construed as a "public offering", even though
each of the purchasers and each of the offerees could be classified as an ordinary
investor and thus apparently immune from the role of "underwriter" even if he
resold; it might not be too difficult to discover the presence of an "underwriter."
Sommer, Who's "In-Control"? - S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 584 (1966).
56. Bromberg, Corporate Liquidation and Securities Law - Problems in the
Distribution of Portfolio Securities, 3 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rgv. 1, 10 (1961).
57. 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
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within Section 2(11). Nowhere in the Act is the key word in Section
2(11), "distribution," defined to require "value." Nor does it appear
that any court has even considered the question of whether or not
value is required. The Act's broader disclosure objectives are equally
subverted where no value is immediately given.
The absence of a "sale" in the dividend transfer from Pub-Corp
to its stockholders is simply too slick a rationale and based upon a too
literal construction of the authorities to avoid the registration require-
ments of the Act. It flies in the face of the overall purpose of the Act
and subverts the very reasons for the private offering exemption.
Admittedly, it requires either a rather complex analysis to find
value, or a decision supported only by the policy of the statute that
value is not necessary, to conclude that Pub-Corp, in declaring a
dividend, is effecting a "distribution" of the securities. 5s Unfortu-
nately, the proposed rules of the SEC, aimed at implementing the
recently published Wheat Report relating to disclosure to investors,
do not quite reach the distribution problem as it exists in the private
sale/spin-off context. 9 The proposed rules would establish some
objective tests to determine when purchasers of securities are "under-
writers" and when they are not. The concept of an underwriter as
one who "offers or sells for an issuer" is declared to include a person
who sells a "restricted" security in a "distribution. '60 A "restricted
security" is defined as any security acquired from its issuer "in a trans-
action or chain of transactions none of which was a public offering
or other public disposition."'" A restricted security will cease to be
restricted after it has been such for any period of five years during
which the issuer had gross revenues of at least $250,000 in each year.62
Holders of restricted securities of issuers who file certain required
reports, however, can make specified limited sales after holding the
securities for one year without such sales being deemed a "distribu-
tion" within Section 2 (11). With this qualification, "distribution" is
defined to mean "any public offering of a security."6
As applied to the private sale/spin-off problem it would appear
that the proposed rules offer no solution to the problem of whether
Pub-Corp is a qualified purchaser within the private offering exemp-
tion. The rules do clearly classify the securities received by Pub-Corp
from Pri-Corp as "restricted" securities. Moreover, by requiring that
the definition of underwriter "shall include (but not be limited to)
any person who disposes of a restricted security . . . in a distribu-
tion" 4 there may be a conscious effort to eliminate the requirement
58. Those in control of Pub-Corp may well be underwriters when they sell to
the public the dividend security they received. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241
(2d Cir. 1959).
59. In its Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969), the Commission
slightly modified the rules proposed in the WHXAT R opT, supra note 45. The
citation of proposed rules hereafter is to those in Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969).
60. Proposed Rule 160.
61. Proposed Rule 161(a).
62. Proposed Rule 161(b).
63. Proposed Rule 162.
64. Proposed Rule 160 (emphasis added).
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that the underwriter sell for value. But this is partially dispelled bydefining distribution to mean any "public offering," thereby incorporat-ing the sale requirement attendant to that term. A dividend distribution
of a portfolio restricted security may therefore not be a "distribution."
Even if the dividend to Pub-Corp shareholders is not a publicoffering, the public market in Pri-Corp shares will not be achieved ifthe recipients of the dividends are not free to resell their shares. Fromthe definition of restricted security and from other provisions ofthe proposed rules, it would appear that the Pri-Corp shares con-tinue to be restricted securities in the hands of Pub-Corp share-holders. 65 Although the Wheat Report and the proposed rules doprovide that relatively small quantities of restricted stock of com-panies making certain required 
-reports to the SEC can be soldwithout the sale being deemed a public offering," no quantity ruleis suggested as to other companies. Although proposing a quantity
rule as to some corporations might suggest that no quantity of re-
stricted securities of other companies can be resold without regis-tration, the explanatory report makes it clear that no such negativeimplication is intended and that only public offerings require regis-tration.67 Thus, past practice must be considered, and such practiceindicates that it is highly unlikely that the dividend recipients, when
selling their few shares, will be labeled "underwriters" as having
made a "distribution." 68
A direct approach to the distribution problem is suggested. Theissuer, Pri-Corp, is claiming the private offering exemption on theground that it is not making a sale to the public. In judging whetherthis claim is correct, it is artifical to focus separately first on the saleto Pub-Corp and then on the subsequent actions of Pub-Corp.69Examination of the purchaser's intent in making the purchase, to-gather with his actions after the purchase, is necessary to determine
whether the original issuer made a private or public offering. The
ultimate question is the character of the issuer's sales; this characteris ultimately explained by the character of the purchaser's intent and
action. In the private sale/spin-off transaction the very purpose forPri-Corp's sale is to place the securities in the hands of the publicby using Pub-Corp as a conduit. The Commission's most recent re-lease in this area suggests that it may view both transactions together
as one scheme by Pri-Corp to distribute its securities publicly andwithout the protective cloak of the private offering exemption.70
Distribution has been described as "the entire process by which inthe course of a public offering a block of securities is dispersed and
65. The definition is found in proposed Rule 161(a). See also proposed Rules161(c) and 162(c) (3).
66. Proposed Rule 162(b) (3) (E).
67. WHZAT RtPORT, supra note 45, at 189.
68. See note 55 supra.
69. SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D.Utah 1958).
70. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969).
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ultimately comes to rest in the hands of the investing public."71 Under
this concept the initial sale and hence the entire scheme may not satisfy
the private offering exemption. 72
III. THE MERGER As A VEHICLE FOR GOING PUBLIC
AND SEC RULE 133
In the Pri-Corp/Sub-Pub-Corp Example C merger situation, the
essence of the transaction is, of course, the same as in Examples A
and B, namely the transfer of an interest in Pri-Corp to the share-
holders of a publicly held company. The Securities Act of 1933 does
not apply if there is no "sale" of securities, and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 requires registration and proxy disclosure only
where the publicly held corporation has total assets exceeding one
million dollars.7" Thus, under present law, the essence of the Example
C transaction, the indirect transfer of something to the public, cannot
be the prime basis for requiring disclosure. The possible weakness in
the scheme stems from the fact that a merger does involve the transfer
of stock of the surviving corporation to the shareholders of the dis-
appearing corporation. Arguably, since these shareholders give value
in the form of either the assets or the shares of the disappearing
corporation, Pri-Corp, they take the surviving corporation shares in a
sale transaction. If a sale is involved, then registration would be re-
quired unless all of the shareholders of Pri-Corp are qualified offerees
so that the private offering exemption of Section 4(2) is applicable.
In the early days of the Securities Act of 1933, the Federal Trade
Commission, then charged with administration of the Act, declared
mergers and consolidations to be subject to the registration require-
ments of the Act.74  The FTC conclusion was short-lived.75  On
September 19, 1935, the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
had by then taken over the administration of the Act, indicated in a
note to its amended Form E-1 that it deemed:
. . . no sales to stockholders of a corporation to be involved
when pursuant to statutory provisions or provisions contained in
the Certification of Incorporation, there is submitted to a vote of
such other person a plan or agreement of a statutory merger or con-
solidation, provided the vote of a required favorable majority
would operate to authorize the transaction and bind all stockholders
with the exception of dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights.76
71. In re Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 888(10th Cir. 1939). See also In re Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226, 234 (1958);
In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 160 (1935).
72. See 12 BNA Sec. Rw. & L. REP. B-1 (Aug. 20, 1969).
73. See §§ 12(g) and 14(a) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(1) (g)
and (n) (a) (1964).
74. Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAW. 78,
79 (1957). This interpretation found its basis in the legislative history of the Act.
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 45, at 254-55.
75. An early SEC decision determined that a proposed statutory consolidation
between Merck Corporation and Merck & Company, Inc., did not involve a "sale"
of shares; therefore no registration was required. WHEAT REoRT, supra note 45,
at 255-56.
76. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493 (Sept. 20, 1935).
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Although Form E-1 was abolished in 1947, 77 the Commission
continued to adhere to the policy of excluding transfers of shares in-
cident to corporate acquisition transactions from the scope of the regis-
tration provisions of Section 5. 78 In a release dated August 2, 1951, 71
the Commission formalized the administrative interpretation based
upon former Form E-1 in its Rule 133.8' This rule, conceived in
controversy and rarely left unchallenged since its birth, again made
it clear that the submission and consummation of mergers and similar
transactions were deemed not to involve an offer or sale within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Act and therefore were not subject to
the registration requirements.8 ' As this article is written (February
1970), Rule 133 still provides a no sale-no registration cloak of pro-
tection for mergers. It further provides, however, as a result of several
1959 amendments, 2 for certain restrictions on the transferability of
securities received by "control" persons of a predecessor disappearing
corporation as part of a merger plan. If such control persons take a
surviving corporation's securities with a view to their distribution to
the public, then they shall be deemed to be statutory underwriters
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. 3 In effect, such
securities received by them, except for limited amounts, 4 cannot be
sold without registration. Of course, since the shareholders of the
disappearing Pri-Corp typically would not have a present intention
to sell to the public, these 1959 amendments do not substantially limit
the Example C technique.
Despite the advent of Rule 133, an atmosphere of SEC peace
and quiet did not pervade the world of mergers and acquisitions.
Six years after the adoption of Rule 133, the Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission expressed doubts about its utility: "It has
been extremely disturbing for the Commission to encounter indications
of . . . evasions of the registration requirements (section 5) of the
Securities Act through reliance upon claimed exemptions or statutory
constructions where the facts do not meet the statutory tests or the
clear statutory intent. '8 5 The Commission had become "concerned
about the use of this Rule as a device to turn loose in the securities
markets substantial amounts of securities without registration or use
77. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3211 (April 14, 1947).
78. Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAW. 78,
80 (1957).
79. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951). This release was later
amended to conform the rule to certain provisions of the new Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3522 (Oct. 26, 1954).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1969). But cf. In re E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 34
S.E.C. 531 (1953) ; In re Talley Industries, Inc., Investment Co. Act Release No. 5953(Jan. 9, 1970), for the rule under Section 17(a) of the Investment Co. Act of 1940,
and Dasho v. The Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), for the rule under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
81. Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 RzcoRD or
N.Y.C.B.A. 162, 165-66 (1959).
82. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959).
83. Subparagraph (b) of Rule 133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(b) (1969).
84. See subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Rule 133. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.133(d), (e)(1969).
85. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762 (Mar. 15, 1957).
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of a statutory prospectus." 6 In effect, it was feared that innocent
shareholders in corporations party to a merger, although not acquiring
securities in typical purchase transactions, were being exposed to
possible fraudulent schemes and being made to give up something of
value in a merger situation without having the magnifying glass of
the disclosure requirements of the Act focused on what they were
receiving therein. 7
Although the concern expressed by the SEC at this time was not
directed at the back-door-going-public nature of the Pri-Corp/Sub-
Pub-Corp merger of Example C, just such a merger could be consum-
mated without Commission regulation by virtue of Rule 133. Hence,
Pri-Corp, through the shell of Sub-Pub-Corp, could in effect become
a public company without being put through the rigorous disclosure
paces of registration. Although Sub-Pub-Corp's pre-merger share-
holders might have had apparently little or nothing to lose in the merger
(perhaps the reason for lack of expressed SEC concern about the
transaction), the fact still existed that, subsequent to the merger, trad-
ing would occur in Sub-Pub-Corp (in effect Pri-Corp's operations
under a new name) stock despite the absence of any information being
available through the SEC on the operations of Pri-Corp and the lack
of any previous public disclosure of Pri-Corp's operating history.
Despite this lack of disclosure, the probability that Pri-Corp manage-
ment will have involved itself in a sale of securities is at first blush
non-existent in the Rule 133 merger situation.8 8
Despite the optimism that such management may muster from
the language of Rule 133, the statutory merger between Sub-Pub-Corp
and Pri-Corp may not be free of registration under SEC practice at
this time, and may soon be subject to more clearly applicable dis-
closure obstacles by virtue of recent proposals by the SEC for reform
of Rule 133.9 Not long after the adoption of Rule 133, the SEC, in
In re Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd.,90 interpreted Rule 133 as excluding
what may be termed "negotiated transactions." This illusive concept
was introduced by the following language of the Commission:
The theory of Rule 133 is that no sale to stockholders is
involved where the vote of stockholders as a group authorize a
corporate act such as a transfer of assets for stock of another
corporation, a merger or a consolidation because there is not
present the element of individual consent ordinarily required for
a "sale" in the ordinary contractual sense . . . . In any event,
where the persons negotiating an exchange, merger or similar
86. Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets - Rule 133, 16 W. Rts.
L. Rzv. 11, 16 (1964).
87. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1957).
88. Even if shareholders of Sub-Pub-Corp had dissenting shareholder fair
appraisal rights under applicable corporate law, there would have been few practical
problems for the merger in this regard because of the fact that Sub-Pub-Corp had
been a shell company with little or no worth. Hence, Pri-Corp would not be subject
to significant fair appraisal liability.
89. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 45, app. VII-4 (1969); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969).
90. 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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transaction have sufficient control of the voting stock to make
a vote of stockholders a mere formality, Rule 133 does not apply.
In such case the transaction is not corporate action in a real sense,
but rather is action reflecting the consent of the persons in control,
and consequently results in a "sale" as to them."
Since in the typical Example C type situation the required majority
of shareholders will usually have participated in the preliminary agree-
ments, it is clear that the negotiated transaction concept could pose
a substantial threat to the merger device for avoiding registration
where the private offering exemption is not available.
There is no good authority, however, as to when the negotiated
transaction principle will be applied. At one time it was suggested
that the rule had been abrogated.92 By 1967, however, it became
apparent that the principle at least still lurked in the minds of the
Commission staff, as so-called no action letters were not, as a matter
of policy, procurable in merger circumstances indicating "negotiated
transactions."9  Hence, the SEC staff-conceived qualifications still
may have to be viewed as a possible, although not intransigently abso-
lute, obstacle in the path of Pri-Corp's goals when following the pro-
cedure described in Example C.
In addition to the "negotiated transactions" limitation, the Great
Sweet Grass Oils opinion stated that certain transactions which were
apparently under Rule 133, "but which in truth were conducted pur-
suant to" a pre-existing plan for distributing a substantial amount of
securities to the public, are outside the Rule.94 The 1959 amendments
to Rule 133 were an attempt by the SEC to curb some of these
"planned distribution" abuses which had emerged in purported Rule
133 transactions. As stated earlier, these amendments imposed limi-
tations on sales of surviving corporation stock received by control
persons of the disappearing predecessor corporation. They did not,
however, eliminate the "no sale" interpretation which lifted mergers
from the clutches of Section 5 registration requirements.
The thrust of the SEC attack on planned distribution transactions
has been on merger situations embodying distributions to the public
of the issuer's stock when the distributions involve a relinquishment
of something of value by the public for such stock. In those instances,
the SEC has sanctioned the merger itself by declaring only that a
Section 4(1) exemption would not be available to sale transactions
by individuals subsequent to the merger since an underwriting with-
in the meaning of the statute would be involved. 5 Thus under current
SEC practice the Commission will begin to take aim on merger efforts
to go public through the back door only once a distribution has occurred
91. Id. at 690-91.
92. Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets - Rule 133, SELZMcrD
ARTiCLtS ON FEDSRAL SZCURITrgs LAw 288, 289 (1968). This article originally
appeared in 16 W. Rss. L. R1v. 11 (1964), but was updated by the author for the
ABA publication cited.
93. Id. at 290.
94. In re Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 690 (1957), aff'd per
curiam, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
95, In re Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 690 (1957).
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subsequent to a merger transaction which evidences a plan to make
public sales of unregistered stock by disappearing-corporation share-
holders as an intended step of the merger planners. So in contrast to
the spin-off attempts to go public discussed in Examples A and B, in
the case of merger transactions such as Example C, present day Rule
133 and planned distribution concepts permit at least the first step to-
ward getting Pri-Corp stock into the hands of public shareholders to
be accomplished without SEC action or sanction.
The back entrance to public status which has been opened for
private corporations by merger techniques may be partly shut very
soon, however, by virtue of recent proposals for reform of Rule 133
suggested in the SEC Wheat Report." The reform has been pro-
posed, not so much out of concern with the problem of going public
through the back door via merger techniques, but out of concern for
public shareholders in corporations which merge with other corpora-
tions, when, with regard to such other corporations, insufficient dis-
closure information is available for informed shareholder action."
This new proposal would, in effect, apply the negotiated transactions
approach of finding a sale in all mergers, with registration being re-
quired if the transaction is otherwise a public offering. The SEC
has proposed that Rule 133 be revised to "provide that the submission
to stockholders of a proposal of the kind referred to above [including
mergers] is deemed to involve an offering of securities to the security
holders of the company being merged or consolidated . *."..8" As
the Commission explains, the reason for the proposed change is thatU.. . when such matters are submitted to the vote of shareholders,
each such shareholder is being asked to determine whether or not he
wishes to surrender the security he then holds for a new security. In
practical effect, therefore, the new security is being offered to him."99
Again, it should be emphasized that the motivation of the Commis-
sion behind its proposed Rule 133 revisions does not arise out of
concern with the effects of the going public device utilized in the
Pri-Corp/Sub-Pub-Corp transaction of Example C. Nevertheless, the
elimination of the no sale portion of Rule 133 should stifle somewhat
the use of Example C type transactions to attain public status by virtue
of the renewed applicability of the registration requirements of the
Act to some of such transactions whether or not previously covered
by the SEC proxy rules. In such transactions, therefore, information
with regard to Pri-Corp's operation in its new Sub-Pub-Corp form
would have to be presented to the Commission for review and would
be available to the public trading in Sub-Pub-Corp shares subsequent
to the merger.
The offer-sale registration approach to mergers required by pro-
posed Rule 133 may not be applicable to all merger transactions. In
fact, it may not be applicable to as many mergers as would a strict
96. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 45, at 280-97 & app. VII-4 (1969).
97. Id. This concern relates especially to merger transactions currently not sub-ject to the requirements of SEC proxy regulation.
98. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969). The release is in accord
with proposals in the WHEAT REPORT, supra note 45.
99. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969).
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application of the negotiated transaction rule because offerings to less
than twenty-five persons are never to be considered public offerings.
As part of the amendment of Rule 133, the SEC proposes a Rule 181,
which would define the phrase "transactions not involving any public
offering" to include the offer or sale of securities to not more than
twenty-five persons who are shareholders in a business being acquired
in a merger or other corporate combination transaction.'00 Such
transactions would, of course, still be subject to the traditional planned
distribution rule. Thus the Commission states that a public offering
requiring merger registration might be involved in an otherwise
exempt Rule 181 transaction where one or more of the group of
twenty-five make a reoffering of the securities to the public. 10 1
If proposed Rule 133 covers the Pri-Corp/Sub-Pub-Corp Example
C situation, the SEC proposals with regard to Rule 133 and registra-
tion of mergers will have a significant deterrent effect on attempts to
use merger devices between private corporations and public shell cor-
porations as a means for going public through the back door. Under
the proposed Wheat Report procedure if Pri-Corp has more than
twenty-five shareholders it probably would have to divulge information
about its operations as a part of the merger. Therefore, not only will
significant information be received by the post merger Sub-Pub-Corp
shareholders, but also, at least at the inception of Pri-Corp's so-called
public existence, there will be registration information on file at the
SEC so as to give individuals who later trade in the post merger
Sub-Pub-Corp shares some kind of disclosure protection with regard
to their investment decisions. If the SEC's proposals with regard to
reforming Rule 133 are not adopted, merger transactions as a device
for achieving public status for corporations such as Pri-Corp will be sub-
ject only to the ad hoc deterrent and sanction that may exist by virtue
of the SEC planned distribution and negotiated transaction doctrines.
It is unfortunate that the expanded private offering exemp-
tion of proposed Rule 181 is part of the proposal to amend Rule 133
because many mergers designed to create a public market in Pri-Corp
stock will escape the rule through the exemption. However, a statutory
change would probably be needed to prevent most of such uses of this
exemption. In terms of the problem which the proposed amendments
to Rule 133 are designed to meet - the need of unsophisticated share-
holders of a corporation disappearing in a merger for accurate in-
formation as to the corporations involved - the private offering
exemption, and perhaps the expanded private offering exemption, may
be appropriate. As stated at the beginning of this section, the sub-
stantive problem in the case of going public without registration via
a merger is the indirect transfer of something to the shareholders of
the surviving corporation.
To meet this problem directly, the registration or proxy solicita-
tion requirements in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should be
expanded to require proxy disclosure in all cases where a publicly
held corporate shell such as Sub-Pub-Corp proposes a merger with a
100. Id.
101. Id.
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corporation for which some form of disclosure has not been filed with
the SEC.1"2 In addition, to avoid the disclosure problems involved in
the subsequent trading of shares of corporations like Sub-Pub-Corp
which have taken over the operations of a private company by way of
merger, the requirement for the delivery of proxy statements or pros-
pectuses should be imposed on brokers dealing with such shares.
IV. NON-REGISTRATION DISCLOSURE AND
BROKER-DEALER PROBLEMS
Avoidance of the registration requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933 has been the major concern of critics of the techniques used
in going public through the back door. 10 Non-compliance with the anti-
fraud provisions, in particular Section 10(b) °4 and Rule 10-b-5" °
promulgated thereunder, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
also pose serious though less sharply defined problems for Pri-Corp
management contemplating a step towards public status via one of the
devices described in Examples A, B, and C.
Presumably Pri-Corp, in all of the examples, was faced with
neither the necessity nor the responsibility of disclosing information
concerning its operations during the days of its purely private com-
pany existence. And because its stock went public without registration
and its concommitant disclosures, Pri-Corp operating information, in-
cluding financial data, still remains beyond the reaches of the securities
marketplace. Hence, when trading begins in the securities of Pri-Corp,
after it has achieved public status through any of the introductory
examples, it is unlikely that sufficient information will exist with regard
to such securities to allow for informed investment decision.
Rumors based upon distortions of the status of Pri-Corp's opera-
tions may stimulate a purchase of Pri-Corp shares in the over-the-
counter market. Also, the original holders of such shares may sell
their Pri-Corp securities without having made an informed invest-
ment decision because of the lack of sufficient Pri-Corp disclosure.
Although the thread of liability may be somewhat tenuous because of
the missing strand of privity,106 if Pri-Corp management can be linked
to a plan which contemplated public trading of such securities, then
such management may find that its back door to public status has
opened into a den of Rule 10-b-5 or other securities anti-fraud legal
entanglements. Arguably, Pri-Corp management played a significant
role in dumping Pri-Corp securities into the public marketplace. By
virtue of such an act, coupled with the lack of information available
102. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(1) and (n) (1964) for the present law.
103. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969) ; Wall Street Journal,
July 3, 1969, at 6, cols. 2, 3; Taylor, The Shell Game - How Some Utah People
Used Dormant Concern To Make Easy Money, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 1969,
at 1, col. 6.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
106. As in other areas of contract law, however, privity has "all but disappeared
from lOb-5 proceedings." A. BROMBFRG, SPCURITIgs LAW: FRAUD - SEC RULt lOb-5§ 8.5, at 205 (1969). See Weisen, Disclosure of Inside Information - Materiality
and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. Riv. 189 (1968).
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about Pri-Corp before or after it had gone public, Pri-Corp manage-
ment, among others, might be deemed to be a part of a manipulative
or deceptive scheme perpetrated upon the public and therefore might
be subject at the least to SEC, if not private shareholder, action. 107
In addition, the Commission has recently suspended trading in
the securities of several over-the-counter companies created by means
of the public shell/spin-off device of Example B.' This is another
potential weapon in the anti-fraud arsenal which private corporate man-
agement should contemplate before going public through the back door.
This disclosure discussion is not intended to cover the clearly
unscrupulous use of shell companies and back door public offerings.
As to unethical promoters of shell companies who inflate stock prices
with misleading corporate information and then make sales of their
own shares at allegedly fraudulent inflated prices,'0 9 the SEC has
already instituted anti-fraud actions based upon Sections 17 (a) and
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act." 0  Although the mass
produced spin-off of Example B may lend itself to such deceptions, it
is to be presumed throughout this discussion that Pri-Corp manage-
ment has not involved itself in anything so overtly fraudulent."'
Rather than contemplating quick sales of its own personal shares at
artificially inflated values, such management merely used a back door
technique to reach public status without the traditional "going-public"
problems. Fraudulent sales of its own shares may take place later in
time, but presumably, unlike unscrupulous "shell game" promoters,
such sales were not a part of the Pri-Corp management's plans for
its back door public offering.
Any discussion of non-registration disclosure problems as they
relate to back door public offerings cannot be closed without mention
of the problems of broker-dealers. Broker-dealers necessarily will be
involved in transactions in Pri-Corp stock that has achieved public
status. The broker-dealer is subject to severe sanctions if he is in-
volved in a transaction which involves a deception or lack of dis-
closure. A broker-dealer suggesting a Pri-Corp security to a customer
in the absence of adequate information concerning Pri-Corp may find
itself tangled in a web of anti-fraud problems. Furthermore, such
dealer "is under an obligation to make his customer aware of known
adverse factors and to direct the customer's attention, if such be the
case, to the lack of available information necessary to reach an in-
107. A manipulative or deceptive scheme would violate subsection (1) (scheme todefraud) of Rule 10b-5, thereby giving rise to SEC investigation and disclosure,
A. BROMBMRG, StCURITIs LAW: FRAUD - SEC RULU lOb-5 § 10.1, at 234 (1969),
followed by private action for rescission or damages. Id. § 9.1, at 226.
108. 21 BNA Stc. RxG. & L. Rrp. A-4, A-5 (Oct. 22, 1969); Wall Street Journal,Dec. 23, 1969, at 4, cols. 1, 2; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10, 1969, at 2, cols. 3, 4; Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1969, at 17, col. 1.
109. Taylor, The Shell Game - How Some Utah People Used Dormant Concern
to Make Easy Money, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
110. See Remarks of Homer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, at National Security
Traders Assoc., Boca Raton, Fla., Oct. 19, 1969. (Homer H. Budge also offered a
description of the machinations of such transactions.)
111. Naturally, however, the legal analysis applicable to the examples described in
this article will relate to the unscrupulous shell game players as well as our misguided
but, nevertheless, scrupulous hypothetical private management.
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formed judgment as to the value of the securities being offered or sold
to the customer.""n 2 On the other side of the usual public market trans-
action, when a broker-dealer receives an order "to sell securities of a
little-known, inactive issuer, or one with respect to which there is no
current information available, except possible unfounded rumors,""'
he must have obtained adequate information about the issuer and the
person or persons desirous of effectuating a trade in order to be rea-
sonably certain that he can comply with the disclosure requirements
imposed upon him by the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.14
Despite the lack of a direct contractual relationship or privity be-
tween the broker-dealer and the issuer or a control person of the issuer,
the dealer must make a reasonable inquiry about the transaction in order
to avoid being charged with participation in an illegal distribution."'
It is difficult to comprehend how a broker-dealer, contemplating com-
pliance with a request to trade Pri-Corp stock, upon inquiry into the
nature of such stock, could make any kind of recommendation to a
prospective purchaser in view of the obviously inadequate disclosure
about Pri-Corp at the time of the proposed trade. Or as the Commis-
sion chairman recently more eloquently stated:
When trading develops in the stock of corporations for which
there is not both accurate and adequate information, the duty
falls upon you [broker-dealer] to recognize the situation and in-
stigate an investigation through your firm before you continue
trading. Your failure in this area may well result in financial loss
to the public and it goes without saying that it also may well
result in your receiving official greetings from the S.E.C."6
V. CONCLUSION
New concepts of "going public" have crept into the minds of
owners of private companies who are intent on putting their firms in
the pink sheets of the over-the-counter market. These concepts involve
the use of spin-off and shell acquisition techniques which avoid tra-
ditional avenues of going public, such as underwriter involvement and
compliance with SEC registration requirements. A private-sale/spin-
off transaction or a shell merger transaction may enable companies like
Pri-Corp to go public to the extent that its shares or the shares of its
successor will be in the hands of a large number of public shareholders.
Public status for the company may bring joy to the hearts of the
Pri-Corp management, but such elation may be ephemeral when the
ramifications of the shell acquisition or spin-off technique become fully
evident. Private corporate management which has employed such de-
112. 12 BNA Stc. Rzr. & L. Rtp. B-3 (Aug. 20, 1969).
113. Id.
114. Id. at B-A.
115. Id., citing SEC v. North American Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) and SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248
(D. Utah 1958).
116. Remarks of Homer H. Budge, SEC, at National Security Traders Assoc.,
Boca Raton, Fla., Oct. 19, 1969.
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vices may find that it has involved itself and its company in violations
of the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. Such
violations may exist by virtue of the fact that no exemption from
registration may be claimed for the private sale aspect of the private
sale/spin-off technique described in Examples A and B. Or violations
may arise, in the case of merger transactions like Example C, because
of the non-existence of Rule 133 "no sale" treatment for such a merger
in light of the SEC's application of "planned distribution" qualifica-
tions to such rule. Also, the use of these techniques may ultimately
result in anti-fraud problems under the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934. A distinct lack of operating and financial information about
corporations like Pri-Corp may raise substantial disclosure problems
for shareholders attempting to sell shares of Pri-Corp once it has
achieved its new public form. Moreover, broker-dealers may find them-"
selves unable to be involved in trades of such shares without sanction
because of this lack of information.
In addition, Pri-Corp management may ask, whether or not it
finds itself involved in securities law violations, whether the com-
pany has really benefited in becoming public by means of spin-off or
shell acquisition devices. The company has not, in fact, raised any
funds to invest in its operations as would be the case in a normal public
offering of its shares. Moreover, the fact that it has spread its shares
without a planned financing program may be deleterious to its future
abilities to obtain financing through the sale of securities. The reluct-
ance of brokers to handle the shares, or the warnings they give poten-
tial buyers, may mean a public market only at a very low price. The
management of Pri-Corp may therefore come to realize that it should
have waited for its company to develop further and to mature suffi-
ciently so that it might have achieved public status through a conven-
tional public offering financing program rather than to have reached
such status by merely having gone public for the sake of going public.
Hence, companies like Pri-Corp may find themselves involved in
possible SEC legal problems by putting the stock of their concerns
into public hands by other than the traditional means of going public.
Furthermore, they may also find that they have achieved very little
from a practical point of view by moving into the realm of public
companies through a back door.
